From our review of the seven hybrid statutes, we find variation between 12 to 18 as the lower age of eligibility and 19 to 26 as the upper age limit of eligibility. All jurisdictions, with the exception of South Carolina, determine age eligibility by a youth’s age at the time of conviction. Michigan and the District of Columbia extend the upper age of hybrid system eligibility the furthest, enabling youth who were below 26th and 25th birthday at the time of their alleged offense to enter the hybrid system, respectively. All jurisdictions, with the exception of Michigan, apply their hybrid systems also to children who were under the upper age limit of juvenile court jurisdiction but transferred (or direct filed, or waived) to adult court for prosecution. All jurisdictions but Michigan and South Carolina disfavor the use of a “tiered system,” and subject all emerging adults within the eligible age range to the same treatment under their hybrid systems.

In accordance with modern research about youth brain development, our model hybrid statute is applicable to all emerging adults, who were 18 through 26 at the time of their offense, and we advise against imposing age-based tiers within this cohort for disparate treatment. All youth below the upper age limit of juvenile court jurisdiction should remain entirely within the juvenile system without exceptions.

We examined three eligibility criteria regarding the nature of a youth’s alleged offense or offense history: whether all youth within the eligible age range can benefit from the hybrid statute regardless of the nature of offense; whether youth can be eligible regardless of a prior hybrid system case; and whether youth can be eligible regardless of prior criminal history other than a hybrid case. Among the seven hybrid systems, we found that Alabama and Vermont meet all three examined criteria. However, most jurisdictions do exclude youth from hybrid statute treatment in cases of designated serious offenses, such as murder or certain sexual offenses. States are generally split regarding whether youth may receive hybrid statute treatment more than once, with four (Alabama, District of Columbia, Michigan, and Vermont) allowing repeated hybrid statute treatment and three prohibiting it. The majority of states do not disqualify youth from eligibility for hybrid statute treatment because of other prior criminal history.

It is our recommendation that jurisdictions offer the most inclusive approaches possible towards emerging adult eligibility, regardless of the nature of offense and prior hybrid statute or other criminal history.

In all jurisdictions except Vermont, application of the hybrid statute is decided in adult, rather than juvenile court. In no jurisdictions is application of a hybrid statute for an emerging adult presumed. The application of a hybrid statute may be requested by the judge, prosecutor, or youth (defense), and is ultimately granted at the discretion of the court. For youth who commit an alleged offense after their 21st birthday, Michigan also requires a prosecutor’s consent for application of the hybrid statute. Only DC, New York, and Vermont include in their hybrid statutes detailed criteria to guide a court’s discretionary decision whether to apply or deny application of the hybrid statute.

It is our recommendation that hybrid statute cases always begin in juvenile court, already equipped with professionals properly trained in youth development. Our proposed model statute includes a strong presumption to applying the hybrid statute. Lastly, criteria to guide judicial discretion in application of a hybrid statute should be explicitly codified in hybrid statutes to minimize the risk of bias and “justice by geography.”

With the exception of Michigan, every hybrid system allows application of the hybrid statute without requiring a guilty plea. The hybrid systems were generally split as to whether they allowed proceedings to be closed to the public, as well as whether youth are granted the opportunity for a jury trial.

Mandating a guilty plea for hybrid system treatment compounds existing vulnerabilities of emerging adults to plead guilty, even against their own interests. Thus, under our model hybrid statute, eligibility is not contingent upon entering a guilty plea, nor are young people required to waive their right to a jury trial. In addition, among the most important provisions of hybrid systems are the confidentiality protections afforded to youth. Because of the lifelong collateral consequences of system involvement, our model hybrid statute includes provisions to protect a youth’s privacy during proceedings, such as a closed court session.

Most hybrid statutes shield emerging adults from the more severe sentencing provisions of the adult criminal legal system. All jurisdictions but DC either limit the length of, or entirely prohibit, incarceration, and all but DC and New York also limit the length of probationary terms for youth under their hybrid system. No jurisdiction other than Vermont prohibits or limits the use of fines and fees for eligible youth.

We recommend that sentencing* provisions of hybrid statutes are drafted in recognition of the continuing development of emerging adults, the harms of incarceration, and the benefits of more rehabilitative and community-centered responses to crime. In our model hybrid statute, mandatory minimums cannot be applied, the use and the length of incarceration and probationary terms are limited. Fines and fees should also be prohibited or limited under a hybrid statute since most emerging adults are financially dependent on their families.

* The use of the term “sentencing” is not accurate for some hybrid systems (e.g. Michigan and Vermont) as an assignment of “youthful trainee” or “youthful offender” status is not technically considered a conviction. We use the term “sentencing” to denote the general category of and compare with similar provisions in other jurisdictions.

Emerging adults are more vulnerable among older populations and have unique developmental needs that would be better supported in the community or in a juvenile correctional system post-sentencing.* Nevertheless, all jurisdictions with hybrid systems house emerging adults incarcerated under the hybrid statute in adult correctional facilities. Florida, Michigan, and South Carolina statutorily provide specialized correctional units for emerging adults within the adult correctional system. No jurisdiction except Vermont allows youth in their hybrid system to remain under the supervision of juvenile probation authorities. In all hybrid systems except South Carolina, courts maintain jurisdiction to review potential violations (as opposed to handing over such authority to corrections or probation post-disposition). Four jurisdictions mandate the provision of support services under their hybrid statute.

Emerging adults should receive developmentally appropriate support and, whenever possible, in the community. If incarcerated under a hybrid statute, they are more likely to have access to such supports in a well-run juvenile facility,** or a specialized unit. Likewise, juvenile (or specialized) probation officers will be better prepared to meet the needs of emerging adults placed on community supervision under a hybrid statute. Research finds that emerging adults inhabit a uniquely promising age window for growth and respond best to positive incentives. Thus, we also recommend that hybrid statutes offer the possibility of reduction of a period of confinement or probation to promote compliance rather than use technical violations or the threat of revocation of hybrid status to sanction noncompliance. In the event of a potential violation, the court should maintain jurisdiction to ensure a fair evaluation of the case. Lastly, hybrid statutes should mandate provision of developmentally appropriate supports to ensure that emerging adults receive the educational, vocational, medical, and other care they need.

* The use of the term “post-sentencing” is not accurate for some hybrid systems (e.g. Michigan and Vermont) as an assignment of “youthful trainee” or “youthful offender” status is not technically considered a conviction. We use the term “post-sentencing” to denote the general category of and compare with similar provisions in other jurisdictions.

** Housing youth incarcerated under a hybrid statute in the custody of the juvenile system would not violate federal laws that seek to separate youth from adults by sight and sound (the Juvenile Justice Delinquency and Prevention Act) and protect them from sexual abuse while held or incarcerated (Prison Rape Elimination Act) so long as youth under the hybrid statute are processed in the juvenile system and not defined and convicted as “adults.” See Raising the Upper Age of Juvenile Jurisdiction: Implications of Federal JJDPA and PREA Requirements.

A criminal record has devastating consequences on the trajectory of an individual’s life. An adult conviction generates innumerable barriers to housing, educational, professional, and personal opportunities available to an emerging adult, which persist for a lifetime. All of these milestones are also critical for desistance from crime and an emerging adult’s healthy transition to adulthood. Thus, arguably, the greatest benefit of a hybrid statute is record protection. Fortunately, every existing hybrid system offers some form of record protection provision. Alabama, Michigan, New York, and Vermont all automatically protect youth against formal records of convictions. The remaining hybrid systems offer other means of record protection, such as a petition for expungement. The scope, procedures, and effects of these different record protection provisions vary greatly between jurisdictions.

Emerging adults have tremendous capacities for positive change. An offense committed in one’s emerging adulthood should not determine the entirety of one’s adult life. Bureaucratic red tape can prevent young people who lack resources and the knowledge with which to navigate legal intricacies from pursuing petition-based record protection procedures.Thus, our model hybrid statute provides automatic record protection upon completion of the case. Providing other means of record protection through a court petition is a less beneficial alternative.